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2
 Microgravity research 
laboratory assembled in 
orbit between 1998-
2011, manned 
continuously since 2000
 Components built by 
companies across 16 
nations. 100+ launches 
from Florida, Virginia, 
Russia, Japan, and 
French Guiana
 Research crew of 6 
astronauts and 
cosmonauts serve 6 
month stay
3Truss: 109 m
Modules:
51 m
Solar Array:
35 m
LARGE, CAPABLE LABORATORY:
Mass: 420,000 kg
Habitable Volume: 388 m3
Solar Power Generation Capability: 84 kW
Numerous external and internal research 
platforms
Earth’s Only Microgravity Research Laboratory
REMOTE OUTPOST:
Altitude: 415 km
Orbital Speed: 28,000 kph (7.8 km/sec)
Orbital Period: 90 minutes 
(16 sunrises/sunsets per day)
Assembly
• 163 launches to ISS between Nov 1998 and Nov 
2015
– 37 U.S. space shuttle assembly missions to ferry 
components, logistics, consumables, research, and crew 
between Earth and ISS
• Space Shuttle was primary vehicle used to assemble 
ISS
– Tremendous mass-to-orbit and orbit-to-Earth capability
– Carried up to 7 crewmembers
– Capability for up to ~10 docked days
– Had its own airlock and robotic arm
– Crew training occurred up until very close to launch
• Late changes could be absorbed by the crews
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Supportability & Logistics
• Original plan
– US Orbital Segment designed to be launched and serviced by the space 
shuttle
– Maintenance concept centers on the “Orbital Replacement Unit” (ORU)
• Plans change – shuttle retires
– Launch as many repair parts, especially parts only shuttle could launch, 
before the program ended
– Develop new means and methods for diagnostics and troubleshooting as 
well as in-situ repair
– Next generation spare parts being designed to use same footprint but 
have separate, stand-alone components that are able to be launched on 
today’s rockets
• Lesson: Anticipate paradigm shift if you can
– ISS was designed in the 1980s and 1990s when the 
expectation was that space shuttle would fly forever
– Adapting now is much harder and likely much more expensive
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Logistics Planning – Skip Cycles
• ISS resupply requires Earth-launched cargo missions
• Spaceflight is complex and HARD
– Launch schedules change frequently
– Mission/cargo needs change
– Weather happens
– Rapid Unplanned Disassembly (RUD) happens
• Orbital Sciences “Orb-3” loss after liftoff  28 Oct 2014
– 2,200 kg lost
• Russian Progress 59P loss at 3rd stage separation 28 Apr 2015
– 2,400 kg lost
• SpaceX CRS-7 loss during 1st stage 28 June 2015
– 1,900 kg + International Docking Adapter lost
• Plan a skip cycle so you can tolerate schedule changes or 
logistics losses
– ISS currently uses ~4-6 month skip cycles for critical 
consumables
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MBSU Failure – Fall 2011
• Main Bus Switching Unit (MBSU)
• Key piece of hardware that routes primary power 
(~160 VDC) from the 8 solar array-fed power 
channels to downstream load distribution 
equipment
– 4 MBSUs on ISS, each routing 2 power channels
– Each can be ‘cross tied’ to 2 other MBSUs in times of 
failure to other channels can power a MBSU’s loads
– Computer commands direct the opening/closing of 
switches in each MBSU to perform power routing
• Switch states are generally not changed (can go unchanged 
for months at a time)
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MBSU Failure – Fall 2011
• MBSU 1 had a circuit card failure in Fall 2011 
where it stopped communicating with its 
controlling computer
– Switches remained open/closed, power was still 
being passed, but switch position could not be 
changed
• Decided the current condition was acceptable 
in the short term but the MBSU needed to be 
replaced “soon”
– Replacement spacewalk targeted for Fall 2012
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Two Bolts – How Hard Can It Be?
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Six Days to Fix the Problem
• Found and utilized technicians that originally 
installed MBSU 1
• Sought input and expertise from hardware 
experts as well as crewmembers who had 
installed similar (H-Bolt) ORUs on ISS previously
• Determined there were two problems
– Foreign Object Debris had likely damaged the truss’s 
bolt receptacle; possibly when originally installed but 
also during previous spacewalk
– Managing side loads on the jacking bolt was critically 
important
• Once we cleaned the bolt receptacle, dithering was 
required!
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Thread Cleaning
No Hardware Store Trips Allowed
• How do you clean nut threads without a tap 
and die set?
– In space?
– In a spacesuit?
– With only the tools and parts you have on hand?
• Simple – challenge your teams to do it and 
get out of their way
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MBSU Replacement Attempt #2
• Step 1: Clean the threads
– A: Take some 0 Gauge (large) wire, spread the individual 
conductors out, and create a ‘wire brush.’  Use Pistol Grip Tool 
(PGT, big cordless drill) to run wire brush in and out of 
receptacle
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Chimney Sweep
Ground version
On-orbit version
MBSU Replacement Attempt #2
• Step 1: Clean the threads
– A: Take some 0 Gauge (large) wire, spread the individual 
conductors out, and create a ‘wire brush.’  Use Pistol Grip Tool 
(PGT, big cordless drill) to run wire brush in and out of 
receptacle
– B: Disassemble spare computer in the ISS to retrieve its 
jacking bolt (same size bolt).  Use it, attached to PGT, to chase 
the threads.
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ACME Bolt
MBSU Replacement Attempt #2
• Step 1: Clean the threads
– A: Take some 0 Gauge (large) wire, spread the individual 
conductors out, and create a ‘wire brush.’  Use Pistol Grip Tool 
(PGT, big cordless drill) to run wire brush in and out of 
receptacle
– B: Disassemble spare computer in the ISS to retrieve its 
jacking bolt (same size bolt).  Use it, attached to PGT, to chase 
the threads.
– C: Use compressed air tool to blow debris out of threads
– D: Use modified toothbrush covered in grease for lubricating 
solar array joint, attached to PGT, to lubricate threads
• Dry film lubricant was expected to have been removed on first 
spacewalk or by wire brush
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Toothbrush
MBSU Replacement Attempt #2
• Step 1: Clean the threads
– A: Take some 0 Gauge (large) wire, spread the individual 
conductors out, and create a ‘wire brush.’  Use Pistol Grip Tool 
(PGT, big cordless drill) to run wire brush in and out of 
receptacle
– B: Disassemble spare computer in the ISS to retrieve its 
jacking bolt (same size bolt).  Use it, attached to PGT, to chase 
the threads.
– C: Use compressed air tool to blow debris out of threads
– D: Use modified toothbrush covered in grease for lubricating 
solar array joint, attached to PGT, to lubricate threads
• Dry film lubricant was expected to have been removed on first 
spacewalk or by wire brush
• Step 2: Install by dithering all the way
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Dithering
Dithering
Training 
Video
MBSU Replacement Attempt #2
• Step 1: Clean the threads
– A: Take some 0 Gauge (large) wire, spread the individual 
conductors out, and create a ‘wire brush.’  Use Pistol Grip Tool 
(PGT, big cordless drill) to run wire brush in and out of 
receptacle
– B: Disassemble spare computer in the ISS to retrieve its 
jacking bolt (same size bolt).  Use it, attached to PGT, to chase 
the threads.
– C: Use compressed air tool to blow debris out of threads
– D: Use modified toothbrush covered in grease for lubricating 
solar array joint, attached to PGT, to lubricate threads
• Dry film lubricant was expected to have been removed on first 
spacewalk or by wire brush
• Step 2: Install by dithering all the way
• Step 3: Complete any tasks possible that were supposed 
to be performed on previous spacewalk
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Ingenuity, Teamwork, Leadership
At All Levels
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Success!
• Successful due to having pre-established a 
culture of high performance and independent 
leadership
– Could not have turned this around in 6 days if 
stovepipes, micromanagement, and all approvals 
only at top level had prevailed
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Success Enablers
• Leadership development
– Infuse in culture of management, engineering, operations, crews
– Purposeful development from the very beginning
– Empower leadership at the lowest possible levels
• Collaboration across organization
– Not just within operations organizations but across management, 
engineering, customers, operations, crew
– Collaboration is a success multiplier – as long as the team at the end 
of the spear (operations) can translate it into execution
• Otherwise it’s just churn
• Paradigm shifts
– Look for them, be open to them, welcome them
• Even when it’s painful
• Think about possibilities even if you think they’re never going to happen
– You may not invest much in it, but thoughtfully decide, don’t just dismiss
• Benchmark; don’t assume you’re the best
• Designing for operability, reliability, and maintainability increases 
mission adaptability and flexibility 
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Questions?
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Backup Charts
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1. To instill within ourselves these qualities essential to professional excellence
 Discipline…Being able to follow as well as to lead, knowing that we must master 
ourselves before we can master our task.
 Competence…There being no substitute for total preparation and complete dedication, for 
flight will not tolerate the careless or indifferent.
 Confidence…Believing in ourselves as well as others, knowing that we must master fear 
and hesitation before we can succeed.
 Responsibility…Realizing that it cannot be shifted to others, for it belongs to each of us; 
we must answer for what we do or fail to do.
 Toughness…Taking a stand when we must; and to try again and again, even if it means 
following a more difficult path.
 Teamwork…Respecting and using the abilities of others, realizing that we work toward a 
common goal, for success depends upon the efforts of all.
 Vigilance...Being always attentive to the dangers of flight; never accepting success as a 
substitute for rigor in everything we do.
2. To always be aware that, suddenly and unexpectedly, we may find ourselves 
in a role where our performance has ultimate consequences.
3. To recognize that the greatest error is not to have tried and failed, but that, in 
the trying, we do not give it our best effort.
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I. Come prepared for your shift. Understand how your discipline fits into the day's activities. Be familiar with unique Flight Data
File for the activities. 
II. Listen closely when the crew talks. If you determine that the information doesn't affect your discipline then you may resume 
your discussions, unless they were on the flight loop. 
III. Condition yourself to react to A/G discussions without having to be prompted by the Flight Director. 
IV. When the crew's comments affect your discipline immediately follow their call with a tailored acknowledgment on the flight 
loop. For example: 
"WE COPY FLIGHT, STANDBY WHILE WE LOOK AT IT." 
"COPY FLIGHT, IT'S A TRANSDUCER FAILURE, NO ACTION." 
"WE COPY AND CONCUR FLIGHT." 
"COPY FLIGHT, HAVE THEN WORK MAL...." 
I. Listen closely to your instructions that get read to the crew. If it has been a while since you made the request for the uplink,
report on the flight loop that you copied the uplink. This lets the flight director know the instructions were read as you intended 
and you are ready to observe the result. When the crew repeats uplinked instructions, particularly those with more than a couple
of steps, acknowledges on the flight loop with "GOOD READ BACK FLIGHT". 
II. Minimize you discussions on the flight loop when the crew is talking. Criticality of your need will dictate this. A good rule of
thumb would be to wait so CAPCOM can listen, if waiting is possible. 
III. An ideal exchange between the crew and the MCC is one in which the Flight Director talks the least. In this case the Flight 
Director can use quick vocal approvals on the flight loop to enhance the efficiency of the communication. 
IV. Minimize discussion over the airways. Use loops unless impractical to do so. 
V. Be ahead of the crew in finding changes to procedures based on flight plan changes or previous failures. Look ahead. 
VI. Switch/circuit breaker actions should be called out with panel, row, and device nomenclature. 
VII. If you have time to write a flight note, write a flight note. 
VIII. Flight note and/or vocal actions should include what you want done, by when, and why. When vocalizing this the preferred order 
is to report what has happened followed by the action required within some time frame. For example: 
"FLIGHT, THE "A" HEATER ON XYZ JUST FAILED SO I WOULD LIKE THE CREW TO SWITCH TO THE "B" SIDE WITHIN 10 
MINUTES. THE SWITCH IS ON PANEL......" 
Last Updated: 7/4/96
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Lessons Learned
Program 
Requirements 
and Objectives
Train
-Final Analysis
-Requirements 
Integration
-Crew/Flight 
Controller Training
-Next Worse Case 
Failure Preparation
Fly
-Safety of Crew, 
Vehicle, Mission
-Implement 
Requirements
Plan
-Vehicle design – flyable, 
sensible, operable?
-Analysis
-Within experience base?
-New hardware/software 
required?
-New Ops Products required?
-New Flight Controller/Crew 
Training required?
-Overall plan 
operable/supportable?
 All aspects of P/T/F embedded in Lessons Learned culture
 Encode, Duplicate successes
 Learn from, Avoid mistakes
 All aspects of P/T/F provide feedback to the Program on the risks/concerns/recommendations 
of Program Requirements and Objectives
CONSEQUENCES
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ISS RISK MATRIX
Mission Operations Directorate
Flight Director Office
   
ISS PROGRAM RISK SCORECARD
Mitigation
High – Implement 
new process(es) or 
change baseline 
plan(s)
Medium –
Aggressively 
manage; consider 
alternative process  
Low – Manage within 
normal processes; 
monitorCONSEQUENCES
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ISS RISK MATRIXLikelihood Rating
5 Very 
Likely 
Expected to happen in the life of the program             
Controls are missing or insufficient
4 Likely
Likely to  happen in the life of the program             
Controls have significant limitations or uncertainty
3 Possible 
Could happen in the life of the program                  
Controls exist, with some limitations or uncertainty
2 Unlikely 
Unlikely to  happen in the life of the program
Controls have minor limitations or uncertainty
1 Highly 
Unlikely 
Extremely remote possibility that it will happen in the life of the 
program
Strong controls in place
Consequence
Rating
Loss of Life No injury Safety
Cannot meet program critical 
path milestone(s)
Impact to Program milestone and/or 
Program critical path
Project  milestone slip
No impact to Program critical path
Can handle with schedule reserve, no 
impact to key project milestone or 
critical path
Minor or no impactSchedule
Major impact (> $50M)
Or 
>10% increase
Major impact ($10M up to $50M)
Or
7.5% to 10% increase
Significant impact ($1M up to $10M)
or
5% to 7.5% increase
Moderate impact ($100K up to $1M)
or
2.5% to 5% increase
Minimal impact (<$100K)
or
0 to 2.5% increase
Cost
- Score by cost of  
mitigating risk
Loss of entire mission 
No alternatives exist
Loss of ISS or any critical 
system, element, major ground 
facility or function
ISS in a condition which 
prevents rendezvous/docking 
operations
Emergency Evacuation
Loss of multiple mission objectives 
Major increase in flight operations 
timelines or complexity
Major degradation in performance
Loss of all design or operating 
margin
Damage to critical system, element, 
ground facility, or function
Planned De-Crewing
Significant impact to mission 
objectives
Operational Workarounds available
Significant reduction in performance
Significant loss of design or 
operating margin
Loss of any non-critical system, 
element, ground facility, or function
Loss of emergency system
Failure to meet any single mission 
objective 
Operating in a degraded state
Moderate reduction in performance 
Can handle within design or 
operating margins
Damage to non-critical system, 
element, ground facility, function, or  
emergency system
Minor or no impact to 
mission objectives
Nominal Execution of 
Mission
Minor reduction in 
performance
Minor or no impact to 
design or operating margins
Mission Success /
Operational 
Performance
(Technical)
543 21
Note:  Risk management is a communication system where a qualitative score can help in understanding of a risk.  This card is only a rough guide for determining 
a likelihood and consequence for a risk.  Significant resources should not be spent scoring a risk.  Score is relative to the risk’s highest elevation; i.e. sub-org, 
Org, or Top Program Risk.
Minor injury, minor illness Significant or long-term injury, illness,   
incapacitation or impairment 
Non-disabling injury
Permanent injury, impairment  or 
incapacitation Disabling injury
SSP 50175 Rev C-1 Page 1 of 2
Flight 
Director
Flight Controllers
Offline/Non Real Time Support
Real Time
Decision Making
Risk Management
Nominal and Off-Nominal
System management
•Office Support
•Offline Analysis
•Engineering Support
•Development
Mission 
Management
NASA/ISS Program
Oversight
Crew
Increment Lead
Flight Director
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A High Performing, High Reliability Organization is Mandatory
Characteristics of 
High Performing Organizations
• Leadership – Leadership is aligned and effective deep within the 
organization
• Leadership in Mission Control
– Unambiguous chain of command within MCC-H and between Control 
Centers
– Leadership within a discipline is expected on and off console; “Lead Your 
Leader” reflects our goal for leadership development at all levels
• Design – The structure is lean and reflects the organization’s strategic 
focus
• Design in Mission Control 
– Documented processes, training flows, and certification guides establish 
both the ends and the means; regularly reviewed to ensure the methods 
align with changing strategic goals
• People – The organization effectively translates business strategy into a 
powerful people strategy, attracting and retaining the most capable 
individuals
• People in Mission Control
– Selective recruiting, Flight Controller Boot Camp, progressively complex 
training and simulations, regular skills assessments and pass/fail 
evaluations with documented pass/fail criterion
Source: Bhalla, Vikram; Caye, Jean-Michel; Dyer, Andrew; Dymond, Lisa; Morieux, Yves; Orlander, Paul 
(2011). “High-Performance Organizations, The Secrets of Their Success,” Used with permission 34
• Change Management – The organization can drive and sustain 
large-scale change and anticipate and adapt
• Change Management in Mission Control
– Mission Control is a balance between being nimble enough to adapt 
to unexpected change yet knowledgeable enough to ascertain 
whether the change is within accepted limits; Next Worse Failure 
planning
• Culture and Engagement – The culture is shaped to achieve 
strategic goals.  Employees pursue corporate objectives.
• Culture and Engagement in Mission Control
– Flight Controller Manifesto, Stone Tablets of Flight Control, 
Foundations of Flight Operations, Plan/Train/Fly, Next Worse 
Failure, Lessons Learned JOPs
» Part of Flight Operations training from Day 1
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Characteristics of 
High Performing Organizations
Source: Bhalla, Vikram; Caye, Jean-Michel; Dyer, Andrew; Dymond, Lisa; Morieux, Yves; Orlander, Paul 
(2011). “High-Performance Organizations, The Secrets of Their Success,” Used with permission
High Reliability Organizations
• Characteristics of successful organizations in high-risk industries
– Preoccupation with Failure
– Reluctance to Simplify Interpretations
– Sensitivity to Operations
– Commitment to Resilience
– Deference to Expertise
Source:  Weick, Karl E.; Kathleen M. Sutcliffe (2001). Managing the Unexpected - Assuring High Performance 
in an Age of Complexity. San Francisco, CA, USA: Jossey-Bass. pp. 10–17. ISBN 0-7879-5627-9
Anticipation
(Prevention)
Containment
(Reacting)
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